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Abstract 
From the earliest efforts to mandate the amount of capital banks must maintain, regulators 
have grappled with how best to accomplish this task. Until the 1980s, regulation had been 
based largely on discretion and judgment. In the wake of two bank failures, the central bank 
governors of the G10 countries established the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) and in 1988, the BCBS introduced a capital measurement system, Basel I. The system 
represented a triumph of the fixed numerical approach, however, critics worried that it was 
too blunt an instrument. In 1999, the BCBS issued Basel II, a proposal to add supervisory 
review and disclosure components to the minimum capital requirement methodology of 
Basel I. Basel II represented a synthesis of the dueling approaches to capital regulation, 
however some argued that the new standards led to an explosion in the complexity of 
financial regulation. This case explores the history of the efforts to regulate bank capital that 
led to Basel II and set the stage for Basel III. 
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1.  Introduction  
From the earliest efforts to regulate the amount of capital banks must maintain, regulators 
have grappled with how best to accomplish this task—by giving banks and supervisors 
discretion to determine adequate capital based on the unique circumstances faced by each 
individual bank, or by establishing specific minimum capital requirements applicable to all 
banks.  
In the United States, the National Banking Act of 1864 created for the first time a system of 
national banks in hopes of replacing the system of state banks with state-issued charters that 
then existed. In so doing, the Act established fixed minimum capital requirements applicable 
to all federally chartered banks, a departure from the diversity of approaches characterizing 
a banking system in which each state defined the capital requirements applicable to a bank 
(if any) in the bank’s charter. Notwithstanding this early example of imposing minimum 
capital requirements, until relatively recently regulation has been based on discretion and 
judgment. This is perhaps owing to a combination of regulatory competition (in which 
jurisdictions establishing minimum capital standards saw banks go to jurisdictions with no 
minimums for charters), the existence of relatively high capital ratios during the early years 
of bank capital regulation and fear that specific minimum capital levels fail to take into 
account the actual situations of different banks.    
In 1974, two events occurred that would take bank regulation in a different direction. First, 
Bankhaus Herstatt, a small German bank with a central role in processing foreign exchange 
transactions, collapsed under the weight of large foreign exchange losses, leaving 
counterparties that had unsettled transactions with the bank with heavy losses as well. 
Second, the Franklin National Bank of New York went under amid allegations of 
mismanagement and fraud in what was the largest bank failure in United States history at 
that time. In the wake of these incidents, in early 1975 the central bank governors of the 
Group of Ten (G10) countries established the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) to provide a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. By the early 
1980s, the BCBS was devoting much of its attention to the deteriorating capital ratios of the 
main international banks. In 1988, the BCBS introduced a capital measurement system 
intended to combat this deterioration, with a minimum capital-to-risk-weighted-assets ratio 
of eight percent. This system, set forth in a document known as the “1988 Accord” or “Basel 
I,” had been adopted by each of the G10 countries by 1993 in a triumph of the fixed numerical 
approach to regulation. 
Despite the success of Basel I in significantly improving bank capital ratios, the eight percent 
approach had limitations that became more pronounced as the banking industry grew 
increasingly complex throughout the 1990s. Echoing the concerns about a numerical 
approach that have existed since the beginning of bank regulation, critics worried that Basel 
I was becoming too blunt an instrument to adequately address the risks banks were facing. 
These worries became particularly acute with the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the Russian 
financial crisis of 1998, and the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management. As a result, in 
1999, the BCBS issued a proposal for a new capital adequacy framework to replace Basel I. 
Released in 2006 and generally referred to as “The New Capital Framework” or “Basel II,” 
this new framework consisted of three pillars: minimum capital requirements, supervisory 
review, and effective use of disclosure. By adding supervisory review and disclosure 
components to the minimum capital requirement methodology of Basel I, Basel II 
represented a synthesis of the dueling approaches to capital regulation that have existed 
from the outset. 
 
 
Yet some would argue that the cost of this continued evolution of the Basel framework has 
been an explosion in the complexity of financial regulation. Basel I was 30 pages. Basel II is 
almost 350 pages. With this growing complexity have come questions about whether 
financial regulation has become too complex to function effectively.  
The remainder of the case is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
history of bank capital regulation before Basel. Section 3 discusses the development of Basel 
I in response to bank failures that occurred in the mid-1970s. Section 4 discusses the 
continuing evolution of the Basel framework with the introduction of Basel II. Section 5 then 
provides a brief introduction to Basel III, which is discussed in greater detail in another 
module. 
Questions 
1. What lessons can be learned from different approaches to bank capital regulation that 
have been utilized at different times throughout history? 
2. What is the appropriate role for human judgment in bank capital regulation, and is 
the Basel framework evolving to strike the correct balance between regulatory 
discretion and minimum capital standards? 
3. Does growing complexity present challenges to the effective functioning of financial 
regulation? 
2. Regulation before Basel 
The early history of bank capital regulation was marked by the absence of anything 
approaching a global framework, and as a result, to the extent that bank capital was even 
being regulated, different approaches existed in different jurisdictions. In Britain, a key 
feature of early banking laws involved a cap on the number of partners who could provide 
equity for a bank. This ensured that the British banking system at the time consisted of 
numerous small banks. A financial crisis in 1825-26, stemming from soured investments in 
Central and South American bonds, caused more than 10% of the banks in England and 
Wales to fail, a fact that the British government blamed on banks being too small to weather 
the storm. Thus in 1826, Parliament authorized “joint stock” lenders to have as many 
partners as desired. Not surprisingly, a period of considerable consolidation ensued (The 
Economist 2014).  
Despite this development, a second financial crisis in Britain almost exactly three decades 
later occurred largely as a result of inadequate bank capital. Discount houses, a new type of 
lender that emerged in the midst of consolidation in the British banking sector, attempted to 
compete in part by reducing the size of non-interest-paying capital buffers to almost zero. 
When declines in the price of U.S. railroad stocks in 1857 triggered a global downturn, British 
discount houses began failing in large numbers (The Economist 2014).  
In the United States, the First Bank of the United States (1791-1811) and the Second Bank of 
the United States (1816-36) were disbanded due to political opposition rooted in suspicion 
of a powerful federal institution seen as lacking constitutional legitimacy. Therefore, by the 
mid-1800s, the chartering and regulation of banks was left to the individual states, resulting 
in great variation across jurisdictions (Barth et. al. 2009). With banks in many states only 
minimally regulated and given the absence of standards for capital requirements across 
 
 
jurisdictions, this “Free Banking Era” from the 1830s to the 1860s was characterized by 
widespread bank failures and an epidemic of counterfeiting.   
Figure 1: The Rise of the Megabanks 
 
Source: The Economist 2014. 
Figure 2: Capital Level Requirements in the U.S.—1864 
Population of Location Minimum Capital 
< 6,000 $50,000 
6,000- 49,999 $100,000 
>50,000 $200,000 
Source: Champ 2007. 
Much as the First Bank of the United States had been the product of financial demands on the 
new United States government stemming from the Revolutionary War, and the Second Bank 
of the United States had been a product of similar demands stemming from the War of 1812, 
the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861 ultimately resulted in renewed calls for 
federal involvement in banking in the United States. The National Banking Act of 1864 
created the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and established a new system of 
federal chartering and supervision. This new system was accompanied by a tax on bank 
notes issued by state-chartered banks, a move seen as an attempt to push state banks to 
become federally chartered and as a way of addressing the practice of some state banks 
fraudulently flooding the marketplace with bank notes not backed by adequate collateral in 
a process known as “wildcatting.”  
 
 
Significantly, the Act provided that any “national banking association” established under the 
Act would be subject to minimum capital requirements based on the population of the 
location in which the bank operated. (See Figure 2.) 
The Act also required banks to provide quarterly reports to the newly established OCC. By 
comparison, the U.K. did not introduce regulatory reporting until 1974 (Haldane 2012). 
While the Act represented a prominent early attempt at establishing specific, numerical 
capital minimums, this approach was the exception. Most state banks in existence at the time 
were subject to regulations that did not include such rules; as only about a half-dozen state 
banking codes mandated capital requirements. Indeed, some have pointed to the existence 
of such requirements at the federal but not the state level as driving a resurgence of state 
banks in the late 1800s despite the Act’s attempt to push banks toward federal chartering. 
Perhaps as a result in 1900, the Gold Standard Act reduced the amount of capital necessary 
for federally chartered banks (Grossman 2010). 
Figure 3: Equity as a Percent of Assets for All Insured Commercial Banks, 1840–1989* 
 
* Ratio of aggregate dollar value of bank book equity to aggregate dollar value of bank book 
assets. For 1840-96, data are for commercial and savings banks. Since 1971, data are for 
commercial banks. 
Source: US Treasury Department 1991 in Tarullo 2008. 
 
The ascendancy of the discretion-based approach to bank capital regulation during this 
period may also be explained in part by the tendency for banks to have high capital ratios. 
As indicated in Figure 3, as late as the 1930s bank capital ratios in the United States were 
nearly twice as high as they are today. Prior to the turn of the 20th century, such ratios were 
even higher, as much as seven times higher than ratios for modern banks. Historical data 
from the U.K. and Australia demonstrate a similar trend (Davis 2010). With capital ratios 
 
 
significantly higher than they are today even in the absence of minimum capital 
requirements, there may have been no perceived need for such minimums despite the 
occurrence of bank failures throughout this period.  
Yet, these extraordinarily high ratios (by modern standards) were falling steadily 
throughout the early 20th century. Despite these declines, no immediate consensus around 
minimum capital requirements emerged. Nonetheless the period surrounding the Great 
Depression and World War II did witness the introduction of new approaches to regulating 
banks. In 1914, the OCC adopted a minimum capital-to-deposit ratio of 10%. By the 1930s, 
the newly created Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) had established minimum 
capital-to-asset ratios. But minimum capital requirements were not uniformly embraced, 
certainly not at the level of a global standard. 
As late as 1972, an OCC official dismissed “capital-to-risk-assets and capital-to-total-deposit 
ratios” because “such arbitrary formulas do not always take into account important factors” 
(Burhouse et. al. 2003). These remarks echo criticism that has been consistently leveled 
against minimum capital requirements since their introduction—that they are too blunt an 
instrument for gauging or guaranteeing the financial health of individual banking 
institutions. Only two years later, however, events would transpire that would ultimately 
result in a widespread shift toward capital adequacy standards based on minimum capital 
requirements. 
3. Basel I 
Perhaps the most significant shift in the history of bank capital regulation occurred as a 
result of two significant bank failures.  
On June 26, 1974, German banking regulators revoked the license of a Cologne-based 
Bankhaus Herstatt after large foreign exchange losses left it insolvent. While Bankhaus 
Herstatt was one of West Germany’s largest private banks with 31 branches and 
approximately $800 million in assets, the bank was relatively small from a global standpoint, 
and its demise likely would not have attracted much attention beyond Germany but for the 
prominent role the bank played in the foreign exchange market. Much as it did every day, on 
the morning of the 26th, Bankhaus Herstatt received millions of dollars of foreign currencies 
for which it was to have paid U.S. dollars in New York later that day. Yet when Bankhaus 
Herstatt was shut down at 4:00 p.m. local time in Germany it was only 10:00 a.m. in New 
York, and the U.S. dollar payments had not yet been made. The collapse of the bank left its 
counterparties unable to collect the money they were owed on these foreign exchange 
transactions, with total losses to counterparties estimated at about $600 million. The 
incident became so infamous that “Herstatt risk” is a term still used to describe the cross-
currency settlement risk resulting from trading across time zones. Bankhaus Herstatt also 
highlighted the fact that even as regulation remained situated at national levels, financial 
markets increasingly were becoming global.  
The article in The New York Times reporting on Bankhaus Herstatt’s collapse includes a brief 
postscript that would prove prescient (Farnsworth 1974). After describing Bankhaus 
Herstatt’s foreign exchange losses, the article noted that “[i]n a somewhat similar situation, 
the Franklin National Bank in New York had foreign exchange losses of $45.8 million in the 
first five months of 1974.” Less than four months later on October 8, 1974, regulators 
declared Franklin National Bank insolvent. With approximately $4.5 billion in assets, the 
bank was the 20th largest in the United States and the largest failed bank in American history 
at that time. As alluded to by The New York Times, Franklin National Bank was also a victim 
 
 
of foreign exchange losses, exacerbated by what regulators characterized as 
mismanagement of the firm and possible fraud. 
In the wake of these incidents, the central bank governors of the Group of Ten (G10) 
countries established a Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices, later 
renamed the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), housed within the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). Founded in 1930, the BIS describes itself as “the world's 
oldest international financial organization” and serves as the bank to the world’s central 
banks. In its role of helping central banks pursue monetary and financial stability, the BIS 
supported the BCBS to provide a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters.  
Meeting for the first time in February 1975, the BCBS began work on what would become its 
first policy document, Report on the supervision of banks' foreign establishments, or simply 
the “Concordat.” The purpose of the report was to “set out certain guidelines for co-operation 
between national authorities in the supervision of banks' foreign establishments, and to 
suggest ways of improving its efficacy” (Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory 
Practices 1975, 1). In it, the BCBS agreed that “the basic aim of international regulation in 
this field should be to ensure that no foreign banking establishment escapes supervision” 
and that “this supervision is adequate, judged by the standards of both host [country in 
which the bank is operating] and parent [country in which the bank is based] authorities” 
(Ibid., 1-2). As part of this effort, the Concordat offered guidelines for the implementation of 
“solvency controls” with some sharing of responsibility for supervision between host and 
parent authorities. The use of terms such as “guidelines” and “to suggest” is significant here, 
because notably the BCBS did not issue binding regulation. Rather, its pronouncements were 
meant to promote the development of standards to be adopted by participating 
governments. 
Figure 4: Bank Capital Levels at FDIC-Insured Banks, 1960-2001 
 
Source: FDIC. 
 
 
While the BCBS’s early focus was on ensuring that banks operating foreign establishments 
would not escape supervision and that such supervision was adequate and consistent, by the 
early 1980s capital adequacy had become the BCBS’s main concern. In the context of the 
economic malaise characterizing much of the 1970s, bank capital ratios declined 
significantly during the decade. As Figure 4 illustrates with respect to banks in the United 
States, equity capital as a percentage of total assets fell from approximately 8% in 1960 to 
below 6% by 1975. 
Regulators saw bank capital levels as problematic for two related reasons. First, inadequate 
capital could jeopardize the global financial system. Second, low capital requirements in 
some jurisdictions could create an uneven playing field for banks. Indeed, Federal Reserve 
Governor Daniel Tarullo has described the work of the BCBS during this period as being 
“motivated by two interacting concerns—the risk posed to the stability of the global financial 
system by low capital levels of internationally active banks and the competitive advantages 
accruing to banks subject to lower capital requirements” (Tarullo 2008). 
In December 1987, the BCBS issued a consultative paper and recommendations reflecting 
several years of work aimed at “achiev[ing] a strengthening in the capital resources of 
international banks in order to help strengthen the stability of the international banking 
system” (Bank for International Settlements 1987, 1). Based on feedback to this paper in July 
1988, the BCBS adopted a framework, which came to be known as “the 1988 Accord” or 
“Basel I” that established for the first time a specific minimum level of capital to be 
maintained by the “internationally active” banks of the G10 nations. In addition to helping to 
safeguard the stability of the global financial system, this minimum level of capital was 
intended to ensure a level playing field by requiring banks from different countries 
competing for the same assets to set aside the same amount of capital for those assets. 
Under Basel I, international banks in G10 nations were required to maintain a minimum level 
of capital based on the amount of their assets as adjusted for the credit risk associated with 
those assets (an adjustment process known as “risk weighting”). (As discussed below, 
market risk wouldn’t become part of the Basel framework until 1996 and operational risk 
not until 2006). Specifically, upon full implementation at the end of 1992, banks had to meet 
a minimum capital to risk weighted assets ratio of at least 8% (of which core capital 
consisting of equity capital and disclosed reserves must be at least 4%, with the balance 
provided by supplementary capital such as hybrid debt capital instruments and 
subordinated term debt). The BCBS explained the use of a risk-weighted approach to capital 
adequacy by citing the following advantages of such an approach over a non-risk-based 
approach: 
• It provides a fairer basis for making international comparisons between banking 
systems whose structures may differ; 
• It allows off-balance-sheet exposures to be incorporated more easily into the 
measure; 
• It does not deter banks from holding liquid or other assets which carry low risk (Bank 
for International Settlements 1988, 8). 
To implement the risk-based approach, the BCBS developed a weighting system comprised 
of five weights—0, 10, 20, 50, and 100%. The amount of an asset included in the risk-
weighted asset total would be equal to the asset’s value multiplied by the risk weight 
applicable to that type of asset. The weights spanned from 0% for assets seen as low risk 
such as cash and certain types of government debt to 100% for corporate debt, real estate 
and certain other assets perceived as being riskier in nature. Thus, the riskier a bank’s assets, 
 
 
the more capital it would be required to maintain under Basel I. (For a complete discussion 
of the requirements of Basel I, see Bank for International Settlements 1988.) 
4. Basel II 
The approach taken in Basel I was not without criticism. Some saw the five-category risk 
weighting system as too simplistic, based on arbitrary classifications rather than the actual 
risk associated with the specific assets held by a given bank. Furthermore, Basel I 
concentrated primarily on credit risk as opposed to other types of risk a bank might face. 
Thus, even as it was introducing Basel I, the BCBS recognized that further development of 
the framework would be necessary in order to effectively address the full spectrum of risks 
facing banks.  
As the BCBS noted in the document outlining Basel I, “[Basel I] is mainly directed towards 
assessing capital in relation to credit risk (the risk of counterparty failure) but other risks, 
notably interest-rate risk and the investment risk on securities, need to be taken into account 
by supervisors in assessing overall capital adequacy” (Bank for International Settlements 
1988, 2). Thus, by design, Basel I continued to evolve over time through a series of 
amendments adopted by the BCBS in subsequent years. Perhaps most significantly, in 1996 
the BCBS issued the Market Risk Amendment to the Capital Accord to require banks to 
“measure and apply capital charges in respect of their market risks in addition to their credit 
risks” (Bank for International Settlements 1996 rev. 2005, 1). The BCBS defined such market 
risks to include interest rate, equity position, foreign exchange, and commodities risk.  
Notably, in measuring their market risks, banks could (subject to certain conditions) choose 
between two alternative methodologies. The first was a standardized approach using 
specific risk capital charges applied by the BCBS to different categories of assets much like 
the treatment of credit risks under the Basel I framework. The second was a new approach 
using the banks’ own internal risk management models to determine risk charges. In 
describing the reasoning behind this latter innovation, the BCBS noted that it “is conscious 
of the need to ensure that regulatory requirements do not impede the development of sound 
risk management by creating perverse incentives” (Bank for International Settlements 1995, 
1-2). And indeed, the Basel framework has widely been seen as incentivizing banks to use 
internal risk models by making the capital requirements attainable using the internal risk 
model approach lower than the capital charges associated with standardized approaches. 
There has also emerged the practice of capital arbitrage, pursuant to which banks use 
securitization and other techniques to reclassify high quality loans into lower regulatory risk 
categories. 
In the summer of 1997, Thailand’s unpegging of its currency to the U.S. dollar resulted in the 
devaluing of currencies across Asia. The ensuing financial crisis had global repercussions, 
sending the Dow Jones Industrial Average, for instance, down 7.2% in one trading session on 
October 27, 1997. Against this backdrop of turmoil, the BCBS identified a need for a more 
dramatic overhaul of the regulatory framework established by Basel I. Writing in 1999, the 
BCBS noted: 
The world financial system has witnessed considerable economic turbulence over the 
last two years and, while these conditions have generally not been focused on G-10 
countries directly, the risks that internationally active banks from G-10 countries 
have had to deal with have become more complex and challenging. This review of 
[Basel I] is designed to improve the way regulatory capital requirements reflect 
underlying risks. It is also designed to better address the financial innovation that has 
 
 
occurred in recent years, as shown, for example, by asset securitisation structures. As 
a result of this innovation, [Basel I] has been less effective in ensuring that capital 
requirements match a bank’s true risk profile. The review is also aimed at recognising 
the improvements in risk measurement and control that have occurred (Bank for 
International Settlements 1999, 4). 
The BCBS adopted the new framework that emerged from this review in June 2006. Known 
as “The New Capital Framework” or “Basel II,” the revised framework updated the minimum 
capital requirements of Basel I with the addition of operational risk alongside credit risk and 
market risk and introduced two new elements: supervisory review and market discipline. 
Together with minimum capital requirements, these two new elements formed the “three 
pillars” of Basel II. 
As described by the BCBS, the purpose of supervisory review is “not only to ensure that 
banks have adequate capital to support all the risks in their business, but also to encourage 
banks to develop and use better risk management techniques in monitoring and managing 
their risks” (Bank for International Settlement 2006, 204). Specifically, the BCBS conceived 
of the supervisory review process as addressing three types of risk: “risks considered under 
Pillar 1 that are not fully captured by the Pillar 1 process (e.g. credit concentration risk); 
those factors not taken into account by the Pillar 1 process (e.g. interest rate risk in the 
banking book, business and strategic risk); and factors external to the bank (e.g. business 
cycle effects)” (Ibid.).  
To do this, the supervisory review process set four principles: 
Principle 1: Banks should have a process for assessing their overall capital adequacy in 
relation to their risk profile and a strategy for maintaining their capital levels. 
Principle 2: Supervisors should review and evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy 
assessments and strategies, as well as their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance 
with regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate supervisory action if they 
are not satisfied with the result of this process. 
Principle 3: Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the minimum regulatory 
capital ratios and should have the ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the 
minimum. 
Principle 4: Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from 
falling below the minimum levels required to support the risk characteristics of a particular 
bank and should require rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or restored (Bank 
for International Settlements 2006, 205-212). 
The BCBS described the purpose of Pillar 3 as being “to encourage market discipline by 
developing a set of disclosure requirements which will allow market participants to assess 
key pieces of information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment 
processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution” (Ibid., 226). The general 
principle underlying Pillar 3 is that “[b]anks should have a formal disclosure policy approved 
by the board of directors that addresses the bank’s approach for determining what 
disclosures it will make and the internal controls over the disclosure process. In addition, 
banks should implement a process for assessing the appropriateness of their disclosures, 
including validation and frequency of them” (Ibid., 228-229). Pillar 3 implements this 
principle by outlining specific disclosure requirements related to the corporate structure of 
the bank, its capital structure, its capital adequacy determinations, and its risk profile.  
 
 
Figure 5: The Three Pillars of Basel II 
 
Source: Asymptotix. 
If Basel I marked the triumph of the specified minimum capital approach to bank capital 
regulation after a long period of approaches characterized by bank and supervisory 
discretion, the addition of the supervisory review and market discipline pillars of Basel II to 
Basel I’s minimum capital requirements represented a synthesis of these two types of 
approaches. Pillar 1 establishes a minimum level of capital required of all covered banks, 
while Pillars 2 and 3 provide banks and supervisors the discretion to establish 
complementary review and disclosure processes appropriate for the specific banks in 
question. (For a complete discussion of Basel II, see Bank for International Settlements, 
2006.) 
But the evolution of the Basel framework as represented by Basel II and later by Basel III 
(discussed below) has also brought what some see as an explosion of complexity. Using the 
length of documentation as a basic indicator of this complexity, Andrew Haldane has noted 
that Basel I weighs in at 30 pages and Basel II at 347 pages (Haldane 2012). A significant 
portion of this added length stems from a shift away from the simple risk weight categories 
of Basel I toward the increased granularity of the internal risk model approach first 
introduced with the Market Risk Amendment and later expanded by Basel II.    
Growing complexity can also be seen in the size of regulatory agency staffs, which have 
increased dramatically both in their own right and relative to both the number of individuals 
employed in the financial sector and the number of financial institutions regulated. As the 
below charts indicate, in both the U.S. and U.K. there has been substantial growth in 
regulatory agency staffs during the evolution of the Basel framework. The U.K. in particular 
 
 
went from just 30 employees devoted to bank supervision as late as the late-1970s to several 
thousand today. 
With this complexity have come fears about the ability of financial regulators to provide 
effective oversight. The use of banks’ own internal risk models in determining capital 
requirements and the variability and potential for manipulation that can result from the 
complexity of these models has been a particular area of concern. (For a more detailed 
discussion of the use of internal risk models and the potential for manipulation, see YPFS 
Case Study on Internal Risk Models, McNamara, et al, 2014C and the “Swiss Finish,” 
McNamara, et al, 2014D.) 
Figure 6: Regulators Employed in the U.S. and U.K. 
 
Source: Haldane 2012. 
5. Basel III 
As Basel II was a reaction to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the global financial crisis of 
2007-08 set the stage for the next major overhaul of the Basel framework. The BCBS, having 
diagnosed the 2007-08 crisis as having stemmed from three main factors (capital of 
inadequate quantity and quality, insufficient liquidity, and the financial system’s 
interconnectedness) introduced Basel III in 2010 to address these issues. (For a more 
detailed discussion of Basel III, see YPFS Case Study McNamara, et al, 2014B.) 
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